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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

RUSSELL G. SLOWE, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

No. 19990 & 20070

RUSSELL G. SLOWE, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
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December 30, 1985 affirraing Defendant-Appellant's convictions in
both.
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

RUSSELL G. SLOWE, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

No. 19990 & 20070

RUSSELL G. SLOWE, SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
oooOooo
COMES NOW Defendant-Appellant

and pursuant to the

provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
herewith moves the Court for a rehearing on both matters pending
before this Court and in support of this motion respectfully
states that this Court has overlooked or misapprehended the
following points of law or fact:

I
ARGUMENT
1.
imposes

In

case

number

19990,

jury

instruction

6(3)

an unconstitutional burden upon Defendant-Appellant

and

relieves the State of its burden of proof.
Jury

instruction

6(3)

states in

pertinent

part

as

follows:
The Utah statutes provide that if a person
has possession of property recently stolen
and gives no satisfactory explanation of such
possession . . . the jury may conclude the
person had an intent to deprive the true
owner of the property and may convict him, if
all the circumstances do, in fact, satisfy
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant
is guilty thereof.
(emphasis
added)
While
decision

this matter was pending,

thereon,

this

Court

but before the Court's

ruled in the case

of

State

v.

Chambers, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (1985) at 18
that a jury instruction using the
language of U.C.A., 1953, Section 76-6-402(1)
is
unconstitutional because it
directly
relates to the issue of guilt and relieves
the State of its burden of proof.
The

Court

further states in the Chambers case

that
. the statutory language should not be
used in any form in instructing jurys in
criminal cases, and we expressly disavow the
language and holdings of our earlier cases to
the contrary.

2

at

18

The instruction to which Defendant objects in this case
suffers

from

instruction

the

same

constitutional

in the Chambers case*

infirmities

as

the

Although the instruction

in

this case does not contain the words "prima facie," its effect is
the

same in that the instruction creates a mandatory

presumption.

In

Franklin,

S.Ct.

105

Chambers

this

Francis

v.

Sandstrom

v^

In this Court's analysis,

those two

States Supreme Court cases have established the principle

that a presumption in a criminal case,
is

discussed

1965 (1985) and the case of

Montana 442 US 510 (1979).
United

Court

rebuttable

unconstitutional.

As

albeit a rebuttable

this Court quoted from the

one,

Sandstrom

decision, found at 1972-1973:
A mandatory rebuttable presumption
relieves the State of the affirmative burden
of pursuasion on the presumed element by
instructing the jury that it must find the
presumed
element
unless
the
defendant
pursuades the jury not to make such
a
finding.
A mandatory rebuttable presumption
is perhaps less onerous [than an irrebuttable
or
conclusive
presumption]
from
the
defendant's perspective, but it is no less
unconstitutional.
It
that

the

is, therefore,

instruction

presumption;

that

set

Defendant's position in this

forth above

provides

it imposes upon Defendant the

a

case

rebuttable

obligation

giving a "satisfactory explanation of such possession .

.

of

.ff of

allegedly stolen property, and that such requirement violates the
mandates of those authorities set forth above.

3

2.

In case #20070 the State's expert witness did not

testify to the fair market

value of the allegedly

stolen

property.
The State's expert witness, both in oral testimony and
written appraisal, which was admitted into evidence as State's
exhibit 6-P, never established what the fair market value of the
allegedly stolen property was.

The exhibit itself states that

$2,878.00 was the replacement value of the ring in question.
Furthermore, Mr. West stated (R,399-R,400) that "a good part" of
his appraisals were for insurance purposes and would, therefore,
go to the replacement value of an item, as would the estate
appraisal.

Mr. West recognized (R,400 18-23) that the definition

of the fair market value of any item is the price a willing buyer
and a willing seller can agree upon.

Mr. West further stated at

(R,400 21-23) that "nobody can say for sure what two people are
going to determine what that might be."
The point is that Mr. West was asked and gave the
replacement value of the item for insurance purposes or for
estate value, but at no time was he asked and at no time did he
give any opinion regarding the fair market value of the ring in
question.
3.

In case number 20070, the misstatements of fact in

the underlying affidavit for search warrant were not "minor
discrepancies" and were in fact made knowingly and intentionally.

4

This Court has held in its previous decision that the
allegations in the affidavit for search warrant were "essentially
accurate."

25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. Defendant contends that the

affidavit must fail because the statements were false.

The

affiant's misstatements of fact in the affidavit for search
warrant (R3-4) are highlighted below, with an explanation of the
basis of Defendant's contentions as follows:
Slowe was told by John Gallegos that the ring is
stolen and that he needed some quick cash.
This statement is absolutely false by reason of the
fact that Cottam, the affiant, had absolutely no conversation
with Gallegos after the "reverse sting" operation but prior to
executing the affidavit.

Cottam testified at a suppression

hearing that after the "reverse sting11 operation that Cottam
received a hand signal from Gallegos !f. . . to be shown as to
whether or not a sale had been made or not.'1

(R200, L 24-R200

LI)
Cottam then testified that he met Gallegos and had a
conversation of approximately 15 seconds with him prior to
executing the affidavit for search warrant. (R202, L7)
recollection of the conversation was as follows:
I said did the deal go down exactly as we
talked about, and he said yes, he bought it,
and he showed me the money. (R202, L9-13)

5

CottanTs

According

to Cottam's

own

testimony,

the

only

information that Gallegos gave him was that information set forth
above.

However, none of that information is stated as part of

the grounds for issuance of the search warrant.

Cottam, in the

affidavit, is speaking in the first person, and nowhere does it
say that John Gallegos provided the information.

Since the

alleged "facts'1 were not known to Cottam, and since he had not
been told them, he cannot legally have stated them as fact on the
affidavit.

These allegations are pure assumptions on the part of

Cottam.
Slowe purchased the ring, believing it was
stolen, and the ring is currently in the
business at this time.
The first statement that MSlowe purchased the ring" in
and of itself may be an accurate statement, but it does not state
the source of the statement. The affidavit, written in the first
person, leaves only the conclusion that that information is in
the affiant's mind

at the time he executed

However, such is not true.

the affidavit.

As discussed above, after the

operation was terminated, the only information provided by John
Gallegos to the affiant was a 15 second conversation wherein
Gallegos told Cottam that Slowe had purchased the ring and
Gallegos showed Cottam the money.

6

(R202, L9-11)

There is,

however, no statement in the affidavit that this allegation is
based on the hearsay

information

of the police

informant,

certainly an important piece of information to the magistrate.
The statement of Slowe's "believing it was stolen,ff is
merely a conclusion on the part of the affiant, and has no basis
in fact whatsoever.

It may have been Mr. Cottam's assumption

that Slowe knew the ring was stolen, but certainly such an
assumption is not competent information to provide for the
issuance of a search warrant based thereon.
These acts were recorded on tape and observed
by affiant and other police officers nearby.
Again, this statement is entirely erroneous.

Cottam

admitted that he was not able to see the alleged sale, (R206,
L18; and R208, Ll-7) neither did Cottam hear the transaction
prior

to executing

the affidavit.

(R206,

L25

- R207,

L8)

Furthermore, Cottam was not told by either of the detectives
supossedly observing the transaction, i.e. Hall or Garrett, what
those officers saw, if anything.

(R197, 14-16 and R209, L6-10)

Neither did Cottam know if the transaction had been
actually recorded on tape, as he alleged in the affidavit. (R198,
3-6)
The allegations made by Cottam in the affidavit were
purely and simply assumptions that Cottam anticipated would have
occurred by the time he actually executed the pre-prepared

7

affidavit.
made

The

point is,

if the alleged "facts" which

Cottam

but which were unknown to him are deleted from the

grounds

for issuance of the search warrant, only the following remains:
On 12/15/83,
police agent John Gallegos
entered the business of Crazy Horse Jewelry,
2470 Washington, . . . Slowe purchased the
ring, . . . and the ring is currently in the
business at this time.
Certainly the foregoing "facts" do not come even
to

providing

the

information necessary to

establish

close

probable

cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
Although

Cottam at no point in the affidavit ever gave

any

indication whatsoever that Gallegos,

was

the

Cottam

the police

source of any of the "facts" alleged in

goes

on

to

justify on page 2

of

the

informant,

the

affidavit

affidavit

that

Gallegos was a reliable source of information as follows:
Your
affiant considers
the
information
received
from the confidential informant
reliable because:
Gallegos has assisted
police on prior occasions, resulting in the
clearance of more than 25 burglaries, and
several felony arrests and convictions.
In the first place,
never

the

affiant

once indicated that any information in or on the affidavit

was received from Gallegos.
the

as alluded to above,

first

"facts"

The entire affidavit is written

person and one must assume therefrom that all of

alleged

therein were within the mind

of

the

in
the

affiant.

Certainly hearsay information is not inadmissable for purposes of
the issuance of a search warrant. However, such information must
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certainly be identified as such.

The foregoing is, then, merely

surplusage which pretends to support the unidentified information
supposedly

provided by a confidential informant,

to

any

state

credibility

of

"underlying

circumstances'1

to

any confidential informant as

and even fails
establish

required

the

by

the

United States Supreme Court in the tests of Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S.

108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 732 (1964) and Spinelli v_^

United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 21 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1969),
or the comprehensive test propounded by that Court in Illinois v.
Yeates,

U.S.
Again,

because

, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
the

statement

itself is not

only

it fails to meet the tests set forth above,

inherently

misleading because it pretends to provide

information

unreliable
but

it

additional

establishing the credibility of an informant who has

not even been identified as the source of any information in
search
certain

is

warrant.
"facts"

To
to

propound the problem the

affiant

corroborate information received

confidential informant by

the

alleges
from

the

stating:

The following information corroborates the
facts given by the confidential informant:
Police officers recorded the conversation by
use of a tape recorder and had constant view
of
the store and on-sight view of our
informant.
Again,
by

any

there can be no ''corroboration11 of facts

confidential

informant

when none

of

the

information

contained anywhere in the affidavit is identified as having
9

given

come

from said any confidential informant.

It would be one thing if

Cottam had stated "Gallegos, a police informant, stated . . ."
However, he did not.

The reader of the affidavit cannot tell

from the 4 corners of the affidavit what, if any,information was
received by Cottam from Gallegos.

Secondly, the allegation that

the police officers recorded the conversation and had "constant"
view of the store and "on-sight" view of the informant is
entirely erroneous and without any foundation whatsoever.

As is

discussed above, Cottam had no conversations with any of the
detectives after the operation and prior to the execution of the
search warrant during which he could have obtained any of the
information set forth.

At that point neither did Cottam know

whether the conversation had been recorded by the narcotics
bureau office (R198, L3-6) and during his 15 second conversation
with Gallegos had no opportunity to discuss with the matter with
Gallegos or verify whether or not the conversation had actually
been recorded.

Furthermore, Cottam admitted (R196, L24-25) that

he only was able to see Gallegos arrive at Defendant's place of
business and leave, and stated that he himself could not see what
was going on the inside of Defendant's business during the
transaction. (R196, L25 through R197, LI)
Again,

the

information

provide by Cottam

in the

affidavit is nothing more than Cottam's assumption that the
conversations were recorded and that officers had constant view
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of the store and on-sight view of the informant.
on

the

part

of

This statement

Cottam is at best misleading and

at

worst

a

serious misstatement of what actually occurred.
Defendant does not accuse the officer who submitted the
search

warrant

affidavit with "recklessly" submitting

affidavit in the criminal sense.
that
in

However,

a

Defendant does argue

the affiant submitted the same intentionally and
the

false

knowingly

sense that the affiant knew and recognized the

acts

he

The definitions of "intentionally11 and "knowingly,"

in

performed and the result that was to follows.

the criminal code, while perhaps creating a standard higher that
contemplated

here,

nonetheless provide a basis for

allegations.

The definition of "intentionally" at 76-2-103, Utah

Code Annotated (1953) is that conduct is so done ".
is

Defendant's

.

. when it

his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or

cause

the result."

As for "knowingly," a person acts

".

when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to

cause

the result."
Surely it is clear from the record that the affiant had
that

kind

discussed
affidavit,

of

affiant

had

the matters with no one prior to his execution of

the

it

intent

can

and knowledge.

the

general

the

hardly be said that he did not know

making false statements.
in

Since

sense

While the affiant may have
that

the

11

other

officers

he

was

understood
to

whom

he

attributes

information he put in his affidavit did actually

the circumstances unfold,

see

nevertheless, the affiant did not know

those facts, and his statements to the contrary are erroneous.
II
CONCLUSION
Jury instruction 6(3) in case 19990 is unconstitutional
in
The

that

it imposes upon Defendant a burden proscribed

Chambers decision referred to herein clearly

by

law.

requires

this

Court to strike down the conviction and grant a new trial.
In
West

utterly

allegedly

case

number 20070 the State's expert

witness

failed to establish the fair market value

stolen

merchandise

in accordance

with

the

of

Mr.
the

Court's

instruction (R.76) that fair market value is . . .
the highest price, estimated in terms of
money, for which the property would have sold
in the open market at the time and in that
locality,
if the owner was desirous of
selling, but under no urgent necessity of
doing so, and if the buyer was desirous of
buying but under no urgent necessity of so
doing, and if the seller had a reasonable
time within which to find a purchaser, and
the buyer had knowledge of the character of
the property and of the uses to which it
might be put.
Defendant
qualified
Court.

as

contends

that

Mr.

West

was

never

an expert within the requirements imposed

by

even
the

The information he gave was competent only as evidence of

replacement value or estate value,
to the issue of fair market value.
12

neither of which is

relevant

On the question of the sufficiency of the affidavit for
search warrant in #20070, this Court has, in its previous ruling,
validated

an affidavit containing major misstatements of fact on

the

of the affiant.

part

As a matter of

policy,

this

Court

should require more than a collection of assumptions in affidavit
form before it validates a serious intrusion into areas protected
by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests
that this matter be reheard in its entirety.
DATED this JJ+ day of January, 1986.

Peter W / Guyon
Attorney for Def^n^ant-Appellant

CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
I,
certify

Peter

W.

Guyon,

counsel for

Petitioner,

hereby

that the instant petition for rehearing is presented

in

good faith and not for purposes of~\delay.

{

ll'N

V

Peter W. Guyon
Attorney for Defen4ant-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned certifies that on the date below a true
and

correct

AND

ORDER

copy of Defendant-Appellant's MOTION FOR
GRANTING

SAME was

mailed

Attorney General of the State of Utah,
Assistant

Attorney General,

to

David

ATTN:

REHEARING

L. Wilkinson,

Sandra L. Sjogren,

236 State Capitol,

Salt Lake City,

Utah 84114 with all postal and other fees prepaid.

DATED this

C-^'day of January, 1986.
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